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Paisley Currah and
Tara Mulqueen
Securitizing Gender:
Identity, Biometrics, and
Transgender Bodies at the
Airport
i t i s w i d e l y a s s u m e d t h at t h e m o r e i n f o r m at i o n
surveillance apparatuses can collect about an individual, the less risk
he or she poses. It is also widely assumed that an individual’s gender
can be, in former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s now infamous taxonomy of information, one of the “known knowns.” But if
identity verification lessens risk, what happens when epistemic uncertainty about gender classification—relied on by the U.S. Transportation
Security Adminstration (TSA) as a first order metric of identity—enters
the picture? In this paper, we examine how gender figures into and
potentially disrupts the link between identity verification and security. The Secure Flight Program, introduced in 2009, requires passengers to provide airlines with their gender classification before they fly.
The “Advanced Imaging Technology” program, put into wide use a year
later, detects not only hidden material but physical anomalies, including unexpected configurations of gendered bodies. Our analysis centers
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on one very particular situation: the confusion that erupts at the airport
when TSA officials perceive a conflict between the gender marked on
one’s papers, the image of one’s body produced by a machine, and/or an
individual’s perceived gender presentation.
Gender has been so deeply naturalized—as immutable, as easily
apprehended, and as existing before and outside of political arrangements—for so long that its installation in identity verification practices
is taken for granted. In what follows, we describe how two separate TSA
programs “operationalize” gender, and we examine what happens when
different epistemic sources of knowledge about gender—individual narrative or gender presentation, the classification as M (male) or F (female) on
the document one carries, and one’s body—clash in the security assemblage of the airport. As part of state security apparatuses’ unceasing quest
for more and better information, both programs, we argue, securitize
gender, the former intentionally and the latter unintentionally. These TSA
programs illustrate the impossibility of predicting with absolute certainty
that something about a person, even something ostensibly sourced from
or lodged in the body such as gender, will stay the same over time.1 We
conclude by suggesting that the effects of gender’s unreliability as an
unchanging measure of identity do not constitute a problem for the TSA
but rather for the individuals whose narratives, documents, and bodies
reveal the mutability of the category. When meanings are contested, as
Hobbes says, it is authority, not truth, that makes the law.
In examining this particular question, we do not seek to present
an all-encompassing molar narrative to account for the many different
ways that state actors produce, reconfigure, and police particular gender
arrangements. However, in this historical moment both technologies
and expanded police powers have greatly intensified what Nikolas Rose
has labeled the “securitization of identity.” Thus, looking at the collision between what Foucault called large “transactional realities”—in our
case, the transactional realities of “gender,” “the state,” and “the body”—
might tell us something about what happens when the apparently unremarkable practices of state identity management work alongside the
heightened scrutiny of bodies in the “war on terror” (Foucault 2008: 297;
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Rose 1999: 240). Certainly, this sort of analysis could be carried out in
relation to any number of “unruly” categories (Caplan 2001: 50); here, we
have chosen to focus on how state actors rely on gender to classify people
and what ensues when different metrics for gender produce less, rather
than more, certainty. We suggest that securitizing gender does not necessarily secure identity, and indeed may destabilize it.2

THE SECURE FLIGHT AND ADVANCED IMAGING
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
Implemented in 2009, the TSA’s “Secure Flight” program requires
consumers to provide the airline with their name, their date of birth,
and their gender exactly as they appear on government-issued identity documents when they book flights. The airlines then transmit that
information to the TSA. Before allowing a boarding pass to be issued,
the TSA will compare that data against the watch lists maintained by
the FBI’s Terrorism Screening Center and confirm that the passenger
is not on any of the lists. To pass into a “sterile” area in the airport,
individuals must present an identity document that exactly matches
the information already given to the airline. By providing more
discrete data points of reference, according to TSA officials, “passengers can significantly decrease the likelihood of watch list misidentification” (TSA 2011). According to a report by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, from December 2003 to January 2006, of the tens
of thousands of individuals who were identified for further screening
at the airport as well as in visa application processes, roughly half were
false positives, primarily because their names were similar to those on
the Terrorist Watch List (GAO 2006: 13). According to the TSA, adding
date of birth and gender to the pieces of information that are collected
will reduce the number of false positives without increasing risk and
thus ensure “Secure Flight.”
The notion that one’s classification as male or female will not
change is such a widely held belief that gender classification has been
part of state practices of recognition since the earliest days of modern
state formations (Noiriel 2001). In addition, gender has been a central
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mechanism for the distribution of rights, obligations, and resources,
including voting, registration for the draft, and eligility for pensions.
States’ powers to classify individuals by gender is essential to much
state-sponsored discrimination based on sexual orientation: for bans
on same-sex marriage to work, officials need to know the gender of
the parties applying for marriage licenses. In the United States, an individual’s gender marker as M or F is included on all state-issued identity
documents or in records associated with the document. But for people
often grouped under the term “transgender,” the gender marker on
a piece of state-issued ID can be troublesome: a transgender woman
presenting herself as female at the airport, might, unlike other women,
have an M on her passport. Conversely, someone who looks like a man
might show a driver’s license with the gender marker of F.
While the heightened intensity of such gender scrutiny is new,
the problem itself is not: the lack of a neat correlation between an individual’s body, her gender identity and presentation, and the identity
document(s) she carries has long posed an obstacle for those whose
gender identity does not correspond to social expectations for the
gender assigned to them at birth. As Currah points out elsewhere,
Sex changes. When some individuals cross borders, walk
into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver’s license, go to prison, sign up for selective service, try
to get married, or have any interaction with any arm of
the state, the legal sex of some people can and often does
switch from male to female, or female to male. To complicate matters even more, almost every state agency—from
federal to municipal—has the authority to decide its own
rules for sex classification. The lack of a uniform standard
for classifying people as male or female means that some
state agencies will recognize the new gender of people who
wish to change their gender and some will not. For most
people, this does not appear to be a problem. For others, it
is (Currah forthcoming).
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For example, in New York City, the policy of homeless shelters is
to recognize one’s new gender and so to house transgender women in
women’s shelters, and transgender men in men’s shelters; the policy
of corrections system, on the other hand, basically ensures that most
trans-women are segregated with male prisoners and most trans-men
with female prisoners.
The criteria for gender reclassification on identity documents is
far from uniform; some agencies require “sexual reassignment surgery”
before they will change the gender classification while others do not.
In 2010, for example, the U.S. Department of State changed its policy
for gender reclassification on U.S. passports and eliminated the requirement for genital surgery (Department of State 2010). But in New York
City, the applicant must submit evidence that “convertive” surgery has
been performed before officials will change the gender marker on a
birth certificate (Currah and Moore 2009). Other agencies will not
change the gender classification in any case: officials in Idaho, Ohio,
or Tennessee will never amend the gender markers on the birth certificates they issue. For transgender people, the immense number of state
actors defining sex ensnares them in a Kafkaesque web of official identity contradiction and chaos. As one woman testifying before a New
York City Council hearing put it,
I do not suffer from gender dysphoria. I suffer from bureaucratic dysphoria. My ID does not match my appearance. I
worry every time I apply for a job, every time I authorize
a credit card check, every time I buy a plane ticket, every
time I buy a beer at the corner deli. I have changed my
name but my gender continues to be officially and bureaucratically M (Currah 2009: 254).
Michelle Billies calls this experience “identification threat,”
which she describes as “a daily contest, a struggle over control of
one’s body as well as the definition of societal membership” (2010: 2).
When an individual’s cultural legibility is not affirmed by their iden-
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tity papers, even everyday quotidian transactions become moments of
vulnerability.
The logic of the Secure Flight program assumes that the gender
marker on a piece of ID will lessen confusion—reducing the number of
false positive matches to the government watch lists—rather than generate it. But for transgender passengers at the airport, a perceived mismatch
between the gender marker on their ID and the gender they present is
flagged as an anomaly. And at the airport, an anomaly is an event that
automatically triggers higher levels of scrutiny. In the ominous moment
when “identification threat” looms as transgender passengers approach
the security area, their vulnerability stems from the gender norms operationalized and backed by the force of law at the airport. Conversely,
in the eyes of security agents, if something about a passenger’s gender
appears odd, she is treated as a potential social threat (Billies 2010: 2).
As a result of the Secure Flight program, travelers whose gender marker
on their identity document does not reflect an airline employee’s or
TSA agent’s perception of their gender—in its embodied totality—risk
facing humiliating interrogations, sexually assaultive pat downs, outing
to colleagues, even denial of travel. Blogger Katherine Cross presents a
phenomenological account of identification threat:
As I engaged in the ritual striptease meant to appease the
airline gods at Denver International Airport, standing at
the bin that I had claimed as my own with an advert I paid
no attention to staring at me from its bottom, a TSA agent
walked up to me. I was depositing my grey blazer in the
bin, my belt soon to follow, and I grew nervous, my throat
tightening as it often does on security lines. But all that the
blue uniformed man did was smile at me and say “Good
morning to ya, ma’am.” At that moment I knew . . . that I
was safe. For now (Cross 2011).
In response to the Secure Flight program, the leading transgender
rights organization tells its constituents in a widely circulated “know
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your rights” flyer that they have the right to “travel in any gender you
wish, whether or not it matches the gender marker on your identification.” But, this advisory adds, “the TSA suggests that transgender travelers carry a letter from their doctor” (National Center for Transgender
Equality 2010).
In late 2010, the situation faced by transgender travelers was
made even worse when the TSA began using advanced imaging
technologies at airports in the United States. According to a leading transgender advocacy organization, these machines generate “a
three-dimensional image of the passenger’s nude body, including
breasts, genitals, buttocks, prosthetics, binding materials and any
objects on the person’s body, in an attempt to identify contraband”
(NCTE 2009). The stated purpose of body scanning—or “enhanced
genital pat downs” for those who refuse to walk through the scanner—is to identify potential threats to the airplane and its passengers. Those threats are hidden on the body. “Terrorists,” warns the
Department of Homeland Security in an advisory to security personnel, “will employ novel methods to artfully conceal suicide devices”
(2003). Under Secure Flight alone, the point of vulnerability is in the
TSA agent’s comparison of an identity document to the individual
presenting herself. After clearing that hurdle, passengers whose
histories or bodies radically confound gender norms could breathe
a little sigh of relief. But with the two new types of technologies
deployed—the Whole Body Imaging program uses both “millimeter
wave” and “backscatter image” technologies—the body enters the
picture, literally. The use of this technology represents a different
instantiation of the securitization of gender and erects yet another
obstacle to transgender travelers. This program was not put in place
to verify identity, yet, for many transgender travelers, the images of
the body unintentionally became another site, to paraphrase Fassin
and d’Halluin, of gender “veridiction,” a place where truth is sought
(2005).
To illustrate, let us return to Cross’s vignette, continued from
above:
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I escorted my belongings, the worn leather boots that
could theoretically contain a bomb, the belt that could
theoretically contain a trigger mechanism. Or cocaine. My
handbag full of feminist literature (now there’s something
explosive). That was when motion caught my eye and I
saw something ominously towering over the old fashioned
metal detector. The rounded slate grey hulk of an X-ray
machine scanning men and women in a surrendering position, arms held unthreateningly high above their heads. I
swallowed thickly wondering if the jig was up, if I would at
last have to face transphobia at the airport, if I would have
to sit in a room listening to impertinent questions about
what was in my knickers (Cross 2011).
As it happened, Cross was not directed to walk through the body
imaging scanner that day. But when travelers do get whole body scans
or undergo intrusive pat downs (touching breast and genital areas), in
some cases TSA agents are seeing in the image or feeling in the pat
downs things they do not expect to be there—male genitalia on female
travelers, or breasts on male travelers. They are also not seeing or feeling things they do expect to be there: men without penises, women
without breasts. These atypically gendered bodies tend to trigger security responses. A letter written to the head of the TSA from three transgender advocacy groups describes incidents that have been reported to
them. They document one case, for example, in which a “male transgender attorney was detained for two hours on his way to an out-oftown court hearing by TSA agents because his intimate anatomy, as
indicated by a whole-body image scan and a subsequent pat down, did
not conform to agents’ expectations of what a man’s body should look
or feel like.” During his detention, he “was subjected to humiliating
personal questions and comments” about the history of his body and
his identity. But that’s not all: a bomb appraisal unit was called in to
evaluate him as a potential threat. Eventually, he was allowed to board
a later flight. But he was advised to carry “a physician’s letter regarding
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his transgender status whenever he flies” so that the situation could be
resolved more quickly the next time (Keisling et al. 2010).
For transgender individuals, unfortunately, these are not isolated
events (see, for example, Kirkup 2009).3 In fact, when Currah mentioned
to a friend that he was working on this article, the friend revealed that
the same thing had happened to him: after walking through the body
scanner, and then undergoing an “enhanced” pat down, he was taken
to a small room where agents announced they had found a “gonadal
anomaly” that had to be investigated as a potential threat to the security of the airplane before he could board. For other transgender people,
the fear of gender-based interrogation is so great that they have chosen
not to fly. According to Katherine Rachlin, a clinical psychologist and
member of the board of directors of the World Professional Association
for Transgender Health,
The full-body scanners became news long before they were
actually used in local airports and were a major topic in
therapy. Patients anticipated that they would be publicly
outed by screeners who saw that there was a mismatch
between a person’s documents and presentation and their
body parts. . . . Patients had increased anxiety and even
panic attacks just contemplating the possibilities. Those
prone to depression went deeper into depression as their
option to travel was taken away (Rachlin 2011).
In describing the anomalies and uncertainties that emerge in the
ways that gender has been securitized at the airport, we are not suggesting that these particular events, however distressing to the traveler, are
comparable to the gross injustices done to some peoples, individuals,
and bodies in the name of national security (nor do we mean to imply
that there is no overlap between transgender individuals and victims
of intensified surveillance and racial profiling) (Queers for Economic
Justice 2010). Indeed, the proliferation of sites where individuals can
be stopped, searched, and required to verify their identity—as part of
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the “war on terror” or as a consquence of federal and state initiatives to
identify, locate, and deport “illegal aliens”—only amplifies the importance of examining the production and policing of legal identity. Nikolas
Rose and Mariana Valverde suggest that there is much to be learned
from drilling down into the apparently more “minor, mundane . . .
meticulous and detailed work of regulatory apparatuses” (Rose and
Valverde 1998: 550). We have followed that suggestion in producing
this very granular analysis of conflicts over gender classification in the
U.S. airport.

TOKEN-BASED IDENTITY VERIFICATION
Rose coined the phrase “securitization of identity” to describe how
“subjects are locked into circuits of control through the multiplication
of sites where the exercise of freedom requires proof of legitimate identity” (Rose 1999: 240). The linking of identity with security does not
depend on a single entity collecting all possible information; it depends,
instead, on particular entities in particular contexts collecting only the
information most useful for the particular risks being assessed. Thus,
the securitization of identity is “dispersed and disorganized” across a
“variety of sites and practices” (243, 242). The securitization of identity is an example of what Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas call
“targeted governance” (2004). While state entities once operated with
the belief that social problems could be solved through large-scale state
intervention, targeted governance focuses the resources of the neoliberal state—concerned not with welfare but with risk management—in
as efficient a manner as possible. In practice, this has meant an ever
greater reliance on information and surveillance technologies which
allow the now more limited activities of governance to be carried out,
it is believed, with more precision: “a ‘smart,’ specific side-effects free,
information-driven utopia of governance” (2004: 239). Because the
security calculus of state actors holds that more identifying information about individuals means less risk, the development of presumably infallible techniques for identity verification has been enrolled in
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the quest for perfect information. In the United States, the airport has
become one of most intensely securitized sites of identity verification
(Lyon 2007).
At present, the Secure Flight program, coupled with the No-Fly
List and the Terrorist Watch List, is only a crude expression of the dream
of perfect information. Identity is not coterminous with identification,
and the impossibility of securely linking the two undermines the desire
for certitude envisioned in the context of the airport. The notion that
an individual’s identity can be verified by linking her to identification papers rests on a number of ultimately untenable assumptions,
as many scholars have shown (Ajana 2010; Caplan and Torpey 2001;
Lyon 2001; Robertson 2009; van der Ploeg 1999; van der Ploeg 2009).
Simply put, document-based verification operates on the premise that
the link between an individual and a document is secure. Such schemes
of “token-based identification,” explains Irma van der Ploeg, base verification on an individual’s “possession of a ‘thing’” (van der Ploeg 1999:
38). However, the provenance of the document—the history that establishes its credibility to verify identity—is not an unmediated correspondence between, say, the passport and the embodied individual who
carries it: it is the authority of the institution that issued it (38). In turn,
the document issuer’s assurance of verity depends on other documents,
documents presented to the certifying authority to establish identity.
Indeed, as Jane Caplan suggests, “this giddy spiral of tokens encompasses the relationship between fact and fiction, between the identity
document and its bearer” (Caplan 2001: 52).
The TSA’s Secure Flight program depends on this token-based
system: to enter a sterile area at a U.S. airport, a TSA agent compares
the individual before them to the official identity document they proffer. The only link between identity document and the body of the
passenger is the photograph which, in the case of U.S. passports, can
be up to 10 years old. Indeed, the Secure Flight program relies on an
essentially nineteenth-century technology—the visual inspection of a
photograph affixed to a document. But the Secure Flight’s technically
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quaint approach to passenger screening may be a reflection of its initial
purpose: it is not primarily designed to verify the identity of passengers at the airport, but “to screen passengers directly against government watch lists” maintained by the federal Terrorist Screening Center
before they arrive there (Transportation Security Administration 2010).
If the current securitization of identity at the U.S. airport is effectively organized around ensuring who passengers are not, biometrics
holds out the promise that a passenger’s identity can be affirmatively
established and assumes that the link between identity and identification can be made secure. Biometric technologies involve capturing
unique information about a particular individual’s body or behavior—fingerprints, gait signatures, iris patterns, facial structure, voice
patterns, DNA, for instance—and digitizing that information, storing
it, and retrieving it to compare against the information extracted on
the spot from the body of the individual presenting herself for identity
verification. As the “‘missing link’” between the immateriality of information flows and networks, and the materiality of individual embodied
existence,” van der Ploeg writes, these technologies “informatize the
body” by transforming it into “a machine readable identifier” (2009:
86–87; see also Magnet 2011; Puar 2007: 175). In the quest for perfect
information, then, policymakers imagine that the body itself will not
just provide, but actually be the perfect piece of information.
Of the possible epistemological sources of human identity—what
one is (a body), what one says about oneself (a narrative), what one does
(a performance), and what one has in hand (a token)—it is the is-ness of
the body that reigns supreme in the quest for perfect information (Ajana
2010). Documents may be fraudulent, individuals cannot be trusted to
vouch for themselves or to maintain a consistent presentation of self,
but the body, it is assumed, cannot be forged and does not lie. Most
significantly, while the body might age, succumb to disease and injury,
its core elements are thought to be stable over time. What verifies
legal identity, or “reidentification” in the lexicon of philosopher Marya
Schechtman, is the “sameness of body” between one time and another
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(1990: 71). At the time of writing, the TSA has not yet installed biometric
technologies for routine passenger identity verification. But, according
to a joint press release by the Department of Homeland Security, which
houses the TSA, and the Department of State, “the next generation of
international travel documents—e-passports that contain a contactless
chip to which biometric and biographic information is written—will
further strengthen international border security by ensuring that both
the document is authentic and that the person carrying an e-passport
is the person to whom the document was issued” (Department of
Homeland Security 2006). Plans are afoot to offer biometrics for flight
crews and airport personnel, and for frequent travelers as well.

GENDER AS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION
However, there is one piece of biometric data, we suggest, already in use
at the airport: gender. In an examination of debates about the criteria
for gender reclassification on New York City birth certificates, Currah
and Moore have shown how gender operates as a biometric identifier in
the eyes of vital statistics officials (2009: 114, 124). While one’s classification as M or F on identity documents is not a unique identifier, as most
pieces of biometric data are understood to be, the assumption that
the classification of M or F is a permanent feature of the body underlies
the rationale for its use in identity verification. Identity is not simply
a matter of who one is but also what one is: “the question ‘who is this
person?’ leaches constantly into the question ‘what kind of person is
this?’” (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 3). As an apparently permanent attribute of the body, one’s gender classification is shared with too many
others (about half the population normally) to be used to verify who one
is, but it can help, it is assumed, to determine who one is not.
That gender is an essential piece of information to collect is
made clear in the TSA’s rationale for including it in the Secure Flight
program. When the Department of Homeland Security asked for public
comments on the proposed program in 2008, one person or organization suggested that the TSA “eliminate the gender requirement . . .
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and instead require passengers to submit information regarding their
ethnicity, race, or national origin.” TSA officials responded by pointing
out that “many names are not gender neutral. Additionally, names not
derived from the Latin alphabet, when translated into English, do not
generally denote gender. Providing information on gender will reduce
the number of false positive watch list matches, because the information will distinguish persons who have the same or similar name” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security 2008: 64034).
While the individual who submitted the comment certainly
might have meant that gender need not be a metric of identity at all—
and it is odd and somewhat suspect that this individual or organization saw race or ethnicity as a better piece of data—the TSA apparently
did not ever consider leaving a passenger’s gender classification out.
As officials made clear in the rationale above, that M or F needed to be
included in the identification details was never in doubt: its response
focused on how that piece of information would best be ascertained—
indirectly through associations with names or directly through requiring disclosure.
But the Secure Flight program does not just use the M or F on the
identity document to screen passengers against the no-fly lists and to
eliminate false positives. If this were all that happens, gender would
not be deployed as biometric data, as unchanging information from the
body. It would, instead, share the same epistemological status as one’s
name and date of birth, the other pieces of lexical information gathered: provisionally useful but ultimately unattachable to an individual
body, resting instead on a “giddy spiral” of other identity documents. In
fact, TSA agents do use gender as a fixed piece of biometric information
about an individual, one that can be checked against the passenger in
front of them. That is, the security apparatus does not just require the
M or F on the document to be compared with information in government watch lists; at the airport, the TSA agent looks at the M or F on
the passenger’s identity document, looks at the passenger, and then
decides if the M or F corresponds to the passenger. Again, as biometric
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information, one’s gender classification cannot be used to verify identity, to allow an agent to say with certainty who one is. But it can and
is used to make a decision about who a passenger is not. In the case of
some transgender people at the airport, sometimes who the passenger
is not is: herself.
Mark Salter points out that airports “condition and normalize
particular identities” (2008: xii). More specifically, in an examination
of effects of national security identification policies on transgender
people, Toby Beauchamp has shown how surveillance systems are
“deeply rooted in the maintenance and enforcement of normatively
gendered bodies, behaviors and identities” (2009: 357). At the airport,
expectations of passengers’ gender reflect the unquestioned and often
unthought common sense of gender as an unchanging biometric characteristic: that there is a perfectly harmonious relationship between
the sex classification an individual is assigned at birth based on a visual
inspection of the body (what one was), one’s current “biological sex”
(what one is), one’s gender identity (what one says one is), one’s gender
presentation (what one looks like to others) and the gender classification on the particular identity document one proffers. Indeed, the vast
majority of people walk through airport security uninhibited by any
confusion over their gender, and those uncontested passages reinforce
and reflect the common sense belief that gender is a unitary component of identity.
But for transgender people, gender is not a singular entity. It is
better understood as a conglomeration—loosely organized under the
ideological rubric of gender—that houses individual gender identity,
state classification decisions (as M or F), a body that may or may not
have been modified to some degree, and presentation through dress
and behavior of the “cultural insignia” of gender. It is not uncommon
for transgender people to “live in one gender while their documents
read another” (Rachlin 2011). There are a dizzying number of possible
ways to upend the expected correspondence between the gender classification on a passenger’s ID document and her embodied gendered
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self. And genderqueer or third-gender individuals who eschew the M/F
gender binary altogether confound the unity of the category even more.
The following examples represent just a few possibilities:
4 A female traveler who had been classified male at birth may have
had many gender-confirming interventions, including hormone
therapy, electrolysis, and vaginoplasty, and might have an identity
document classifying either M or F.
4 A female traveler who had been classified male at birth may present as female, have retained her original genitalia, and carry an
identity document classifying her a s either M or F.
4 A male traveler who had been classified female at birth may have
had masculinizing hormone treatment, wear a full beard, have
male pattern baldness, had masculinizing surgery to transform
female breasts to male breasts, retained his original female genitalia, and carry an identity document classifying him as M or F.
4 At the airport or in other moments of “identification threat,” some
individuals will align their gender presentation with the gender
classification on their identity documents—effectively “passing” as
the gender assigned to them at birth.
4 Finally, to add to the chaos, in each of the hypothetical cases, it’s
also possible—indeed, even common—that the individual has one
identity document with an M and another with an F.
Conflicts between or among the different sources of knowledge
about gender—identity documents, the body, an individual’s performance—can produce a category crisis. Benjamin Singer calls this the
“transgender sublime,” and describes it as an experience in which “the
sheer variety of trans bodies and genders exceeds [agents’] cognitive
capacity to comprehend them” (2006: 616).
The epistemic uncertainty revealed in these moments of dissonance, however, does not augur the end of the securitization of gender,
or even undermine it. As Stuart Hall reminds us, it is an intellectual

572

social research

conceit to imagine that “the world will collapse as a result of a logical contradiction” (1988: 166). That no particular knowledge regime
can put an end to debates about which characteristic of gender should
be the definitive one does not put state actors out of the business of
classifying gender. Decisions backed by the force of law do not have to
be internally coherent. Instead, it is transgender travelers who suffer
the effects of systemic confusions about gender classification. And it is
transgender travelers who are forced to contort their gendered selves
to appear as conventionally gendered as possible at the airport. In his
research on borders and transgender identity management practices,
Reese Kelly has documented the tactics that gender nonconforming
people use to avoid drawing attention to themselves. In a summary of
his findings, he writes,
The very possibility of pat downs and scrutiny of identity
documents contributed to many participants engaging in
what I refer to as identity normalizing strategies. These
normalizing strategies often consisted of the deliberate construction of a normatively gendered presentation
of self. . . . A few individuals in my study changed their
gendered appearance to coincide with their identity documents that still listed their sex assigned at birth and which
often had outdated photos. . . . Almost all of the individuals I interviewed . . . described engaging in bodywork and
presentation rituals in order to appear non-threatening in
regards to all aspects of their identities (Kelly 2011).
These identity management strategies require adding a metalevel
analysis of the social production of gender. It is axiomatic in the theories that inform much thought about gender, at least in the humanities
and social sciences, that gender is performed rather than expressed,
that gender is an effect rather than a cause, that gender is produced
through social relations rather than through willful acts of individuals.
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But at the airport, successfully negotiating the different and contradictory ways that gender has been securitized requires a performance of a
performance.

GENDER IN THE AIRPORT SECURITY ASSEMBLAGE
What complicates the passage of a transgender individual through
airport security is that her identity is not obvious in the way it is
expected to be by the TSA. A United Nations human rights special
rapporteur pointed out that “counterterrorism measures that involve
increased travel document security, such as stricter procedures for issuing, changing and verifying identity documents, risk unduly penalizing
transgender persons whose personal appearance and data are subject to
change” (United Nations 2009: 19). Yet, the transgender experience at
the airport is more than just an exception. The biometric use of gender
should not be seen as just a policy decision that, however unjustly,
limits the freedom of a very small minority of individuals. It also shows
how particular notions of gender come to be stabilized through their
incorporation into larger systems of organization and control.
In actuality, how gender is defined in any particular context
depends not on what one might think gender is, but on what it does
in that context: there is no unitary notion of gender to which an individual simply does or does not conform. It is not only “personal appearance and data” that change, but the very concept of gender. In shifting
our analysis this way, we can, following Deleuze, ask a more productive
set of questions: “in what situations, where and when does a particular
thing happen, how does it happen, and so on? A concept, as we see it,
should express an event rather than an essence” (1995: 14). As an event,
the concept of gender is bound to the particular context in which it
occurs, whether it be the airport, the doctor’s office, or the courtroom.
Likewise, there is no coherent, singular state authority policing gender
definition, but different authorities: indeed, “the state is just as messy
and diffuses a concept as gender” (Currah forthcoming). That different state actors dispersed across the U.S. federal system of government
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have different requirements for changing gender markers on identity
documents illustrates this point. Sometimes genital surgery is required,
sometimes not. But instead of fixating on what gender “really” is, how it
ought to be defined, we might see these arbitrary and conflicting rules
for gender reclassification in another light: not as perplexing contradictions but instead as expressions of different state projects: one centered
on recognition, the other on distribution.
The concept of assemblage, from Deleuze and Guattari, provides
one way of understanding how the contingent, chaotic, and epistemologically ungroundable concept of gender can be deployed in security mechanisms as if it were a tangible hard fact. Assemblages can be
understood broadly as “functional conglomerations of elements” in
which each element gains meaning in its relation to the others in the
assemblage (Currier 2003: 203). The security assemblage at the airport
is a convergence of many parts, from technologies and security strategies to bodies and social norms; it is, like the airport itself, “a messy
system of systems, embedded within numerous networks and social
spheres” (Salter 2008: xiii). The airport security assemblage prevents
certain individuals and materials from reaching the plane, while it also
allows the maximum number of people to pass through unrestricted,
so as not to inhibit the “flow of commerce” (U.S. GAO 2010: 10).
Gender can be seen as one of many “flows” or “forces” that come
into the assemblage: it is not invented in the airport assemblage, but
reconfigured by it in specific ways. As Haggerty and Ericson explain,
flows “exist prior to any assemblage, and are fixed temporarily and
spatially by the assemblage” (2000: 608). In the context of an ever more
uncertain and unknowable world of possible risks, gender anomalies
are cause for heightened suspicion and scrutiny. Gender, in the security
assemblage at the airport, is deployed as a biometric, a piece of data
tied directly to the body. This “securitized” variant of gender, operationalized in the assemblage, is more than just a norm from which
transgender individuals constitute an exception. As Currier points out,
“a self-identical body (or object) cannot be identified prior to, or outside
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of, the field of encounters that articulate it within any specific assemblage;” instead, through the assemblage, something new or “other” is
created (2003: 331). At the airport, the “something other” for gender is
what we are calling its securitization.
The securitization of gender is doubly useful in conceptually
grasping what happens to gender at the airport. Following Rose’s observations about the “securitization of identity,” we have used “securitization” to describe how gender becomes an object of state (and increasingly
private and privatized) surveillance through the two TSA programs.
In that sense, the “security” in securitization reflects forms of control
associated with sovereign power—barriers, bans, prohibitions, punishments, searches by uniformed personnel, interrogations. But identity in
general and gender in particular are also securitized in another sense—
as a form of risk management, as techniques for “governing the future”
(Valverde 2007: 163). Risk management is not only a central mechanism
of governmentality, but also of capital. In fact, it may be that the financial analogy is the most apt here. In finance, securitization involves the
bundling of disparate pieces of debt into financial instruments. And
what is debt? Debts are obligations, promises to repay at some point
in the future. Securitization is, as Randy Martin explains, “the future
made present” (2007:18). In the security systems assembled by the
Transportation Security Administration, the disparate identities/bodies/
documents that fall under the rubric of gender are provisionally stabilized into objects that will hold steady over time—a promise of identity as future sameness. The TSA recommends that transgender people,
especially transgender people “in transition,” carry letters from their
doctors. These letters generally affirm the genuineness of the individual’s attachment to the new gender, and, in doing so, become forms of
security. Likewise, the evidence required to change the gender classification on an identity document—typically affidavits from physicians—
attest to the permanence of the new gender in the future.
Just as the securitization of debt attempts to turn promises about
the future into tangible commodities in the present, the securitization
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of an individual’s gender tries to render uncertainty about the future
more predictable. Foucault pointed out in a 1978 lecture that to manage
contingency, “the temporal, the uncertain . . . have to be inserted within
a given space” (2007: 20). Security is comprised of spatial arrangements
that create a milieu that can manage or lessen the impact of whatever unpredictable events the future holds. While identity as being,
as narrative, as process, is a temporal category, the body—in our case
the gendered body—is figured as spatial, something that can be known
by the presence or the lack of certain configurations of flesh. To pass
through airport security without issue, an individual’s gender is securitized by attempting to turn the body into not such a source of information but a promise about the present and the future. As individuals
flow through the systems of surveillance and control in the airport,
transgender people—with their incongruous and unexpected histories,
documents, and bodies—often find themselves in the uncomfortable
interstices between spatial and temporal registers, between stasis and
change, between what one is and what one says or does.
NOTES

1. In this paper we use the term “gender” rather than “sex.” The meanings of both terms are widely contested in the hard and soft sciences,
in the humanities, in legal theory, in women’s and gender studies,
and increasingly in popular discourse. Ultimately, the only thing
we know for sure about what sex means, or what gender means, is
what state actors, backed by the force of law, say those words mean.
Legal definitions of gender and the various criteria states use to classify individuals as male or female are certainly fraught, but they do
matter because gender is a mechanism for the unequal distribution
of rights and resources. Because the TSA uses “gender” to refer to
one’s classification as M or F on identity documents, we have chosen
to do so as well, for consistency’s sake.
2. A small caveat: while many of the points we make about how gender
becomes securitized may be applicable to other agencies inside the
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United States, and to contexts outside of it, our research is limited to
the two specific programs put in place by the TSA. The U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol has already installed biometric identification technology at all border locations but this article examines the identity
management processes of only the U.S. Transportation Security
Agency. It is our hope that the admittedly narrow focus of this investigation generates insights that a broader approach might miss.
3. We have submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to the
Transportation Security Administration asking for any documents
that indicate if officials considered how the Secure Flight and Whole
Body Imaging program would affect transgender and gender nonconforming people. At the time of writing, we had not yet received a
substantive response from the TSA.
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